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Biopower, Disability and Capitalism: Neoliberal Eugenics and
the Future of ART Regulation
GABRIELLE GOODROW*
Discourse around reproductive and contraceptive technology in the United States is
typically organized around ideas of autonomy, privacy, and free choice. The dichotomy of
“pro-choice” and “pro-life” structures all debates on the topic, and the political framework
of neoliberalism channels discussion into prepackaged frameworks of cost-benefit analysis
and the primacy of free market choice. However, an examination of history and present
policy developments paints a different picture. This Note argues that access to and
regulation around contraception, abortion, and overall reproductive health and technology
has been informed by and continues to interact with ideas of biopower and both positive
and negative eugenics, and that neoliberal conceptions of free reproductive choice ignore
the implications of this connection.
Part II traces the history of the eugenics movement in America, exemplified by forced
and coerced sterilization of people considered mentally or physically “degenerate,”
particularly those confined to institutions, and explores the rhetoric in early contraceptivefocused treatises and court decisions that reflect eugenicist views. Part III analyzes the
modern trends on legal access to and regulation of reproductive and contraceptive
technology and its interaction with race, socioeconomic status, and, in particular, disability
(one of the more anxiety-producing categories of humanity in the neoliberal era). In Part
IV, the Note goes on to argue that construction of a rational and compassionate legal
framework where a woman’s right to choose is preserved (or revived) and the humanity of
disabled persons is also respected is not only possible, but essential.
A truly feminist reproductive framework must be built on justice, not market choice,
and must respect both the agency and autonomy of pregnant women and the humanity and
individual subjectivity of disabled persons. Policy strategies towards this end will not be
easy, but attention to all the intersectional and overlapping factors that affect women’s
reproductive decision-making, especially with regard to disability and reproductive
technology, can change the way we view and value disabled personhood in our society.
I. INTRODUCTION
Contemporary discourse on reproductive technologies and the legislative
and regulatory environment surrounding their production, distribution, and use
tends to rely on several fundamental assumptions, mainly relating to the
individual autonomy of the people using these technologies. From contraception
to fertility treatments to abortion or prenatal care, society tends to structure debate
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around the idea that end users of reproductive technology make the choice
between types of reproductive technology, and whether or not to engage in
reproductive technology use at all. We assume that producers of reproductive
technology have largely neutral objectives and are producing a product or service
for a marketplace like any other.
In particular, disability and our relationship to it as a community fuels both
of the major “sides” of the abortion/contraception debate. The eugenic history of
our nation provides ample fuel for these arguments, as the stamping out of
disability was and is one of its foundational goals.
Pro-life advocates argue for the right to life of every fetus, but are often
completely ignorant1 of the circumstances that many disabled women or disabled
infants will face postpartum, and often espouse conservative financial positions
that oppose calls for healthcare and welfare reform that would allow disabled
mothers and children to live full and happy lives.2 Pro-choice advocates do
recognize these constraints but often, and worryingly, see free access to
contraception, prenatal testing and abortion as a way to end disability (at least
congenital disability) forever – and elevate this as a proper goal to strive for, again
ignorant of the eugenicist ideals which this viewpoint espouses.3 These value
judgements connected to disability affect the way we consider disabled
personhood in our society, and erode disabled peoples’ rights in a very real sense
– “[t]he right to bear children goes to the heart of what it means to be human. The
value we place on individuals determines whether we see them as entitled to
perpetuate themselves in their children.”4
Unfortunately, jurisprudence around contraception and abortion has focused
almost exclusively on individual privacy and autonomy arguments and has
largely ignored structural impediments to free reproductive choice. Current legal
discourse around reproductive technology almost completely elides the eugenic
roots of many of these technologies and is inattentive to the ways in which they
are still abused for neo-eugenicist purposes. It is at this juncture that it becomes
useful to consider the historic roots of reproductive technology and question how
those foundations affect the structural landscape of reproductive technology,
reproductive control, and our conception of disability at large. In the words of
disability rights feminist Rayna Rapp,
[A]t the intersection of the disability rights movement and the feminist movement
for reproductive rights lies a thorny problem: How is it possible to contest the
eugenic and stigmatizing definition of disabilities which seems to underlie

1. I use ignorant here in its active sense of habitually to ignore something, rather than in the
passive sense of simply existing in a state of non-knowledge.
2. For an interesting look at the history of the alliance between pro-life activism and traditional
conservatism, see Eric C. Miller, When Being Pro-Life Did Not Mean Being Conservative, RELIGION & POL.
(May 31, 2016), https://religionandpolitics.org/2016/05/31/when-being-pro-life-did-not-mean-beingconservative/ (interviewing Daniel K. Williams, associate professor of history at University of West
Georgia).
3. Sujatha Jesudason & Julia Epstein, The Paradox of Disability in Abortion Debates: Bringing the
Pro-choice and Disability Rights Communities Together, 84 CONTRACEPTION 541, 541 (2011).
4. DOROTHY ROBERTS, KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE, REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF
LIBERTY 305 (1999).
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[assisted reproductive technology], while still upholding the rights of individual
women to determine what kind of medical care, and what sorts of pregnancy
decisions, are in their own best interests?5

This Note argues that there is a way to construct a rational and compassionate
legal framework where a woman’s right to choose is preserved6 but the humanity
of disabled persons is respected. A truly feminist legal framework built on notions
of reproductive justice can and must respect the agency, autonomy, humanity, and
individual subjectivity of both pregnant women and disabled persons.
II. HISTORICAL EUGENIC ROOTS OF REPRODUCTIVE CONTROL
A.

Early Eugenic Thought

Early proponents of contraception and reproductive science often had
eugenic motives, in that they saw reproductive technology as part of a wider
objective to use genetic science to improve the “stock” of the human race.7 By the
mid-to-late 1800s, advances in genetic technology had already led to
improvements in agriculture and livestock.8 America was faced with an exploding
population and a burgeoning industrial revolution, resulting in increased
urbanization and concomitant class stratification.9 In the face of these new
problems, many scientists saw eugenics (from the Greek words for good and kin)
as a way to improve the lot of humanity overall.10
The rise of scientific methods of categorizing and regulating the natural
world led to the creation of the concept of biopower, or governments becoming
concerned with the regulation and control of the physical bodies of their
citizenry.11 Through biopower, governments “make human life ‘itself,’ that is, the
vital processes that characterized their populations, the target of power.”12 The
ruler no longer ruled by divine right or blood lineage, but through control and
surveillance over the life, death, sickness, and wellness of their populace.

5. RAYNA RAPP, TESTING WOMEN, TESTING THE FETUS: THE SOCIAL IMPACT OF AMNIOCENTESIS IN
AMERICA 50 (1999).
6. Or, indeed, revived – one cannot “preserve” that which does not currently exist, even
nominally, for many women.
7. See Alexander Graham Bell, How to Improve the Race, 5 The J. OF HEREDITY 1, 1 (1914) (“The
individuals have power to improve the race, but not the knowledge of what to do. We students of
genetics possess the knowledge but not the power; and the great hope lies in the dissemination of our
knowledge among the people at large.”).
8. Id. (“Living organisms have been so plastic in the hands of scientific breeders that we have
learned to improve our breeds of plants and animals by suitable selection controlled by man.”).
9. See generally, Allan C. Kelley & Jeffrey G. Williamson, Population Growth, Industrial Revolutions,
and the Urban Transition, 10 POPULATION AND DEV. REV. 419 (1984); A.R. Desai, Urbanization and Social
Stratification, 9 INDIAN SOC. SOC’Y 7 (1960).
10. See generally Bell, supra note 7.
11. Michel Foucault, HISTORY OF SEXUALITY: VOLUME I: AN INTRODUCTION 140 (Robert Hurley
trans., Pantheon Books 1978) (1976) (“[A]n explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving
the subjugations of bodies and the control of population.”).
12. Ladelle McWhorter, From Scientific Racism to Neoliberal Biopolitics: Using Foucault’s Toolkit, in
THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF PHILOSOPHY AND RACE, 282, 287 (Naomi Zack ed., 2017).
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Biological and medical science, and in particular the emerging fields of genetics
and genealogy, were used to segment and control populations. Biopower and
eugenic thought have always gone hand in hand.
Eugenics exists in two flavors – positive and negative. Positive eugenics
focuses on incentivizing citizens with good genetic traits to reproduce, whereas
negative eugenics disincentivizes the reproduction of genetically flawed members
of the population.13 In the late 1800s and early 1900s, genetic fitness was quickly
conflated with social class, with reformers focusing on controlling the
reproduction of the poor and socially undesirable and regarding the wealthy as
inherently more fit.14 This stratification of the acceptable and unacceptable body
and mind – and state reactions to those different categories – is at the core of
traditional Foucaultian biopolitics.15 “Social class was equated with human worth,
and low-class, undesirable families—a drain upon the public coffers—were
understood as a blight upon society, a burden to be relieved through mechanisms
of human abatement.”16
This is not to say that early eugenicists were not met by obstacles. Eugenicists
were worried about the propensity of wealthier, more educated couples to have
only one or two children and wanted to encourage the societal elites to pass on
more of their favorable genes. However, societal elites had evolved a set of
conflicting values that made the concept of viewing their own reproduction by the
same metrics as the thoroughbreds they stabled completely repugnant.17
Numerous practical scientists of the day were attuned to this problem, seeing
it as a matter of “social ideals.”18 Across America, “better baby” and “fitter family”
contests were held at state fairs to hold up examples of superior American
bloodlines and encourage others to strive towards that ideal.19 However, scientists
and policymakers bemoaned that “[t]he [ideal] classes concerned [were] outside
the scope of direct legislative interference . . . [they] supported society, and [were]

13. See James Jamieson, Alexander Graham Bell: Eugenicist, 42 MANKIND Q. 65, 70 (2001) (“By
positive eugenics we refer to measures aimed at increasing the fertility of the fit, whereas negative
eugenics aims at eliminating specific defects from the gene-line.”).
14. See R.A. Fisher, Positive Eugenics, 9 EUGENICS REV. 206, 206 (1917) ( “To increase the birth-rate
in the professional classes and among the highly skilled artisans would be to solve the great eugenic
problem of the present generation and to lay a broad foundation for every kind of social advance.”).
15. Kasper Simo Kristiansen, Michel Foucault on Bio-Power and Biopolitics, Univ. of Helsinki Faculty
of Soc. Sci. 1, 34 (Apr. 2013) (Master’s thesis, University of Helsinki Faculty of Social Sciences and Moral
Philosophy) (“[P]ointing precisely to the tendency of Western societies to produce hierarchies
according to which people can be arranged in unequal and coercive order.”).
16. James C. Oleson, The New Eugenics: Black Hyper-Incarceration and Human Abatement, 5 SOC. SCI.
1, 3 (2016).
17. For example, Alexander Grand Bell, a hobbyist eugenicist,
[C]ould already see that human values which run contrary to the principles of evolution and
the realities of the universe . . . only constitute a threat to the survival of humanity, for no
values that run counter to reality [could] ever be fulfilled, and must work to the detriment
of those whom they were intended to benefit.
Jamieson, supra note 13, at 68.
18.
19.

Id. at 65.
Oleson, supra note 16, at 3.
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not supported by it,” unlike the degenerate classes that the legislature was busily
regulating.20
They knew that though “[t]here was an underclass . . . from whom nothing
could be hoped,”21 true eugenic betterment of society must flow from both the
eradication of negative characteristics and the promotion of beneficial ones. Even
progressive reformers like suffragist Victoria Woodhull latched onto the idea,
proclaiming that “if superior people are desired, they must be bred,” and
conversely that the “unfit” must not be allowed to breed freely.22 However,
positive eugenics was no match for the social mores of the day that required
upper-class female sexuality (and fertility) to be closely guarded and rarely
acknowledged.23 Without a convenient entrée into the private lives and choices of
the populace, scientists were at a loss on how to effect eugenic change.
In contrast, the law’s intervention on the reproductive destinies of those who
were “supported by [society]” was exploding.24 Statutes allowing sterilization of
institutionalized persons began popping up in state after state, starting in
Indiana.25 At the time, many advocates of sterilization saw it as an easy solution to
complex problems of social welfare and poverty as well as a way to curtail certain
devastating physical ailments for which there was no viable therapeutic cure.26
They saw themselves as preventing a great deal of suffering – as well as a great
deal of social expense.27 Leaving the degenerate classes to their own immorality
resulted in great taxpayer expense, since modern sensibilities prevented the
governing classes from allowing the poor to starve. So, charitable handouts shifted
to government-run institutions for those classes, and much notice was paid to the
“gravity” of the task assumed by managers of such institutions: to restrain the
“feebleminded” from “overt acts of immorality” that would only increase the
population of such dependents, chiefly through isolation and institutionalization
rather than education or rehabilitation.28
Compared to detaining women adjudged “feebleminded” for the entirety of
their childbearing years, commenters thought it seemed more humane to “give
them the benefit of a milder and less severe method of attaining the desired end.”29

20. Fisher, supra note 14, at 206.
21. Jamieson, supra note 13, at 70.
22. HARRY BRUINIUS, BETTER FOR ALL THE WORLD: THE SECRET HISTORY OF FORCED STERILIZATION
AND AMERICA’S QUEST FOR RACIAL PURITY 144 (2006).
23. Elizabeth Fee, Psychology, Sexuality, and Social Control in Victorian England, 58 SOC. SCI. Q. 632,
632 (1978) (“[S]exual repression characterized the bourgeoisie – at least as an ideal of conduct, if not as
an exact description of reality . . . .”).
24. Fisher, supra note 14, at 206; See MARK A. LARGENT, BREEDING CONTEMPT: THE HISTORY OF
COERCED STERILIZATION IN THE UNITED STATES 66–67 (2007) (discussing how many states passed
compulsory sterilization laws in the late 1800s and early 1900s).
25. LARGENT, supra note 24, at 66.
26. Id. at 3.
27. Id.
28. BRUINIUS, supra note 22, at 56 (quoting Dr. Albert Priddy’s 1923 Annual Report for the Virginia
colony).
29. Id.
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The “milder and less severe” method often alluded to is sterilization – at first
voluntary, albeit often coerced, and then involuntary; first of men of criminal
background and later, of “feebleminded” women.30
The involuntary sterilization of a nineteen-year-old institutionalized girl
named Carrie Buck was the procedure at issue in Buck v. Bell, a landmark case for
the American eugenics movement.31 In upholding the constitutionality of Carrie
Buck’s sterilization, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes drew an allusion to other
forms of biopower and state valuation of bodies that is at once startlingly prescient
and disturbingly nonchalant.
We have seen more than once that the public welfare may call on the best citizens
for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who already sap
the strength of the state for those lesser sacrifices, often not felt to be such by those
concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with incompetence . . . Three
generations of imbeciles are enough.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, over 63,000 people had been coercively
sterilized under laws like the one in Virginia – laws which were present in twothirds of the States.33
Further, American scientists and policymakers in the mid-1930s decided that
American eugenic policies were ripe for export – which eventually led to much
human suffering and the transformation of eugenic policy in America. The eugenic
establishment targeted Germany, and to great effect. By the middle of the decade,
Germany’s racial hygiene laws were in large part based on the American Model
Eugenic Sterilization Laws, and American organizations like the Rockefeller
Foundation had begun funding various sterilization programs there.34 However,
the success of eugenic rhetoric quickly produced unforeseen results.
The German programs were more politically unified and intellectually
homogenous, and this single-minded focus on their eugenic goal resulted in not
only the compulsory sterilization of over 500,000 people who were disabled or
social misfits, but also the systematic murder of 300,000 institutionalized disabled
people through a program of involuntary euthanasia known as Action T4,35 and
most notably Hitler’s Final Solution, better known as the Holocaust, a program of
brutally efficient ethnic cleansing that detained and murdered six million Jewish,
Roma, homosexual, and otherwise socially undesirable groups.36 After 1945 and
the liberation of the concentration camps, eugenics taken to its logical extreme
horrified the American public. In the 1960s and 1970s, American eugenic
movements largely lost social capital and support; a new generation of scientists
decried the policies of their forbears, the sterilization laws were repealed, and both

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 57.
Id. at 3–5.
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927).
LARGENT, supra note 24, at 1.
STEFAN KÜHL, THE NAZI CONNECTION: EUGENICS, AMERICAN RACISM, AND GERMAN
NATIONAL SOCIALISM 21 (1994).
35. M. Rotzoll, P. Fuchs & P. Richter et al., Die nationalsozialistische “Euthanasieaktion T4” [The
National Socialist “Euthanasia Action t4”], 81 DER NERVENARZT 1326 (Nov. 2010).
36. LARGENT, supra note 24, at 129–30, 139–40.
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the law and the technology of reproduction shifted to a more individualized,
market-based model.37
B.

Evolving Reproductive Rights

Modern reproductive rights in America are a set of interlocking contentious
issues that have seen massive evolutions in both legally protected interests and
popular opinion. The right to access contraception and abortion has been, and
continues to be, debated extensively in the courts and the legislatures on both a
national and state level. However, the status quo seems to have settled on the
legality of contraceptive use and abortions up to a point, contingent on the
government’s compelling interest in regulating abortions to protect the health of
women.38
In particular, Roe v. Wade framed the right to abortion through the
fundamental right to privacy rather than through a gender equality argument,
which served to narrow the agenda of reproductive rights work and limit the
responsibility of the government to ensure equal access to reproductive health
services.39 Reproductive rights jurisprudence has instead been co-opted by a
libertarian “freedom-from” unjustified government intervention, which has
detrimental effects on aspects of reproductive rights that are distinct from the right
of “determined middle class white girls” to pay for an abortion.40 The legal
argument that clinched Roe’s victory also limited its prospects, since “restricting
abortion decisions to the ‘personal,’ [or] the ‘private,’ also meant severing their
deep connection to issues of economic and social justice.”41
III. THE CURRENT LANDSCAPE – POLITICAL DEADLOCK, UNREGULATED INNOVATION
A.

Neoliberalism and Reproductive Rights: A Binary Debate

In the postwar neoliberal American economic and political landscape,
reproductive technology is largely a private-sector affair, with certain notable
exceptions. However, eugenic pressures still affect policy choices and constrain
individual decision-making with regard to reproductive choices, particularly with
regard to disability. Freedom – of trade and of individual choice – is a
foundational tenet of neoliberalism. Nevertheless, facial freedom without
attention to the structures that all but guarantee that choice is constrained by
context – access to information or resources, legal status, even geographic location
– is hollow at its core. “[T]he emotional or affective registers of neoliberalism are

37. Id. at 124–25.
38. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
39. Andrea Smith, Roundtable: Reproductive Technologies and Reproductive Justice, 34 FRONTIERS: A
J. OF WOMEN’S STUD. SPECIAL ISSUE: REPROD. TECH. AND REPROD. JUST. 102, 102–03 (2013).
40. Laura Briggs, Roundtable: Reproductive Technologies and Reproductive Justice, 34 FRONTIERS: A J.
OF WOMEN’S STUD. SPECIAL ISSUE: REPROD. TECH. AND REPROD. JUST. 102, 103 (2013).
41. Rosalind Petchesky, Roundtable: Reproductive Technologies and Reproductive Justice, 34
FRONTIERS: A J. OF WOMEN’S STUD. SPECIAL ISSUE: REPROD. TECH. AND REPROD. JUST. 102, 107 (2013).
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attuned to notions of ‘freedom’ and ‘choice’ that obscure systematic inequalities”42
and indeed “divid[e] women against each other” in the reproductive context.43
Though the state has largely retreated from the field of coercive sterilization,
economic and social forces affecting individuals’ reproductive choices have
tended to replicate eugenic objectives. Neoliberalism as a dominant and
dominating political rationality “moves to and from the management of the state
to the inner workings of the subject, normatively constructing and interpellating
individuals as entrepreneurial actors.”44 Individual citizens are driven to selfpolice their health and bodily welfare, while at the same time “the erasure of the
New Deal and the US state’s increasing divestment of the care of its citizens
(including cutting programs upon which people with disabilities depend for their
very survival) has produced a cultural climate of anxiety that is central to the
affective realm of neoliberal governance.”45 This constant fear that one’s
inattention to one’s own health can precipitate an inexorable slide into disability
and valuelessness is productive and entrenching for neoliberal society. A citizenry
steeped in bodily anxiety will agitate not for more public support for nonnormative bodies and lives, but for more individual access to technologies which
will keep each individual body healthy, working, and valuable to the system for
longer and longer periods.
Political and legal discourse around the subject of reproductive rights is
designated either as pro-choice or pro-life, and few people question what values
the “life” and “choice” that are being touted actually stand for, or who each group
envisions as able to access that “life” and “choice.” The concept of the disabled
body is used as a rhetorical device by each side, and the larger forces that control
what technology is made available, and to whom, are rarely looked at through a
disability studies lens. “While today’s feminists are not responsible for the eugenic
biases of their fore-mothers, some of these prejudices have persisted or gone
unchallenged in the reproductive rights movement today.”46 Both positive and
negative eugenic ideals and motivations have survived into the modern era:
positive eugenics in our unregulated assisted reproductive technologies
(hereinafter ART47) market, and negative eugenics in the panoply of reproductive
regulations present in the prison and welfare contexts.

42. DEAN SPADE, NORMAL LIFE: ADMINISTRATIVE VIOLENCE, CRITICAL TRANS POLITICS, AND THE
LIMITS OF LAW 22 (2015).
43. RICKIE SOLINGER, The Incompatibility of Neo-Liberal “Choice” and Reproductive Justice, in
REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE BRIEFING BOOK: A PRIMER ON REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE AND SOCIAL CHANGE 77, 77
(2008) (highlighting how an individual woman’s set of choices is often dependent on another woman’s
lack of choices, i.e. in giving a baby up for adoption, selling gametes, or even providing childcare).
44. Catherine Rottenberg, The Rise of Neoliberal Feminism, 28 CULTURAL STUD. 418, 420 (2014).
45. Shoshana Magnet, Identity and The New Eugenics In The Newborn Screening Saves Lives Act, 35
MEDIA, CULTURE & SOC’Y 71, 72 (2013).
46. Marsha Saxton, Disability Rights and Selective Abortion, DISABILITY STUD. READER 73, 75
(Lennard J. Davis ed., 2017).
47. See infra Section III.B.3 (explaining current ART dimensions).
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The Good Old Days (Aren’t Over) – State Control over Reproduction

1. Prison
In 2014, an internal investigation of sterilization in California prisons
revealed that doctors coerced pregnant female prisoners to undergo tubal ligations
immediately postpartum when they discovered that the women already had more
than two children.48 One of the physicians accused of pressuring women into the
procedure acknowledged an underlying eugenic rationale for the sterilizations,
saying that the amount paid up-front for the procedure “isn’t a huge amount of
money, compared to what you save in welfare paying for these unwanted
children—as [women incarcerated in California prisons] procreated more.”49
Even outside the carceral setting, sterilization or long-term contraception can
be worked into plea agreements, terms of probation, or parole hearings, even
though in those coercive contexts, informed consent to any procedure, even
nominally therapeutic, is nearly impossible.50 Also in California, creative
probation sentencing resulted in a woman named Darlene Johnson being ordered
to have Norplant implanted as a result of her conviction for child abuse.51 This
sentence, imposing a years-long reproductive penalty, raises serious questions
about the motivations of the sentencing judge. “Forced contraceptive use in
response to allegations of child abuse is punishment, not therapy, because it does
not protect the existing children, as counseling would.”52 Eugenic rhetoric
immediately surfaced in discourse around the sentence, with one op-ed claiming
that “Norplant is the ideal contraceptive for the brainless people (of all races and
socioeconomic groups) who have unprotected sex and bring unwanted children
into the world only to beat them.”53
In a similar case, a Wisconsin court ruled that a man convicted of
nonpayment of child support could not have another child unless he could prove
to the court that he had the financial ability to support that child along with the
nine he already had.54 Given his financial situation and the fact that he was already
guilty of nonpayment of child support, this term of probation was a de facto ban
on the defendant’s right to procreate for the duration of his probation term.

48. Rachel Roth & Sara L. Ainsworth, “If They Hand You a Paper, You Sign It”: A Call to End the
Sterilization of Women in Prison, 26 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 7, 8 (2015).
49. Oleson, supra note 16, at 6.
50. Roth & Ainsworth, supra note 48, at 10; Janet Simmonds, Coercion in California: Eugenics
Reconstituted in Welfare Reform, the Contracting of Reproductive Capacity, and Terms of Probation, 17
HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. J. 269, 276 (2006), see also The Marshall Project, Sterilization of Female Defendants
as Plea Deals: A Curated Collection of Links, (last updated Feb. 07, 2018), https://www.themarshallproject
.org/records/1134-sterilization-of-female-defendants-as-plea-deals.
51. Simmonds, supra note 50, at 287.
52. HARRIET A. WASHINGTON, MEDICAL APARTHEID: THE DARK HISTORY OF MEDICAL
EXPERIMENTATION ON BLACK AMERICANS FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 211 (2007). The author
notes that standard policy is always to remove all children from an abusive household, and not allow
more to be adopted in – however, the point remains that forced use of contraceptives does not ensure
that someone will be a good parent, only that they will not be a parent at all.
53. Carolyn Hendricks, The Norplant Sentence, WASH. POST (Jan. 14, 1991).
54. Simmonds, supra note 50, at 289.
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Reproductive penalties are not a bug, but rather a feature of our criminal
punishment system. Incapacitation in the prison context has a prophylactic effect
on human reproduction, and since Black men and women are incarcerated at
disproportionate rates, this prophylaxis affects them most dramatically – as in the
nineteenth century, isolating this population during their procreative years
necessarily dampens the birth rate.55 We see family creation as a privilege that can
be lost via the social transgression that is criminality – our courts have explicitly
decreed that the right to procreate is “fundamentally inconsistent with
incarceration.”56
Given current American jurisprudence identifying procreation as a
fundamental right,57 one would think that the state would need a compelling
objective in order to require contraception as a term of probation, but sentencing
judges are able to sidestep inquiry into their motives by arguing that the
individual being sentenced is perfectly free to choose to go to prison instead.
However, this choice is illusory, and threatens the further fracturing of the
defendants’ families in each case.
2. Welfare
With the rise of contraceptive availability, subsidized medicine became a
convenient locus of intervention in poor and Black women’s fertility.
Contraception clinics in Black neighborhoods were more likely to recommend
long-acting contraception or sterilization than those located in white
neighborhoods.58 In fact, white women were often denied sterilization altogether
unless they met an arbitrary formula based on age and the number of children that
woman already had.59 “Sometimes clinic workers use feminist language to
encourage women to suppress their fertility, explaining that controlling their
bodies is a fundamental condition for improving women’s status.”60 However,
these same workers often prioritize targeted population control over women’s
autonomy, telling themselves they are working toward a greater good.61
Welfare regulations display a similar racial stratification. Although there are
more white people than Black people on welfare62 and social science data
overwhelmingly rebuts the idea that women on welfare become pregnant for the
purpose of obtaining more benefits, the archetype of the “welfare queen” in the
American imagination is consistently a Black woman.63 This suspect motherhood

55. Oleson, supra note 16, at 1.
56. Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 2002).
57. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
58. LORETTA ROSS & RICKIE SOLINGER, REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTION 51–53 (2017).
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id. at 84.
61. Id. at 84–85 (“Nevertheless, clinic workers around the world – and also in the United States –
are often trained to prioritize population control goals above women’s empowerment.”).
62. Ann C. Foster & Arcenis Rojas, U.S. BUREAU OF LABOR STAT., Program Participation and Spending
Patterns of Families Receiving Government Means-tested Assistance (Jan. 2018).
63. See ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 17 (“The myths about immoral, neglectful, and domineering
Black mother has been supplemented by the contemporary image of the welfare queen—the lazy
mother on public assistance who deliberately breeds children at the expense of taxpayers to fatten her
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has concrete effects on policy choices around provision of resources to these
families. Policymakers controlling welfare distributions often define poor children
– and their mothers – as “illegitimate,” suggesting that “the government itself
disregarded their humanity” and found their mothers’ sexuality and reproductive
choice-making eminently sanctionable.64 A Philadelphia Inquirer editorial claimed
that “[t]he main reason more black children are living in poverty is that people
having the most children are the ones least capable of supporting them.”65 This
further illustrates how structural and social factors that reinforced Black poverty
were elided in favor of blaming Black mothers for their own motherhood.
Further, attempts to control the fertility and sexuality of poor women by
conditioning the receipt of welfare on behavior modification have been prevalent
in neoliberal welfare reform.66 These interventions have ranged from family caps67
to implantation of long-acting contraceptives68 to surgical sterilization.69 The same
Inquirer article that blamed Black poverty on Black fertility had a natural solution
– it called for poor women to be paid to have Norplant (a long-acting contraceptive
implanted in the upper arm) implanted to “reduce the underclass.”70 This was not
a rogue opinion of one editorialist, however. Federally funded programs like
Medicaid “eagerly proffered the cost of inserting Norplant,” but if the woman
undergoing the procedure experienced side effects (of which there were many),
those same programs were “less forthcoming with the five-hundred-dollar
removal fee.”71
Structural incentives pushed these women to give up their reproductive
freedom, yet a neoliberal analysis would praise their “free” choice to do so. These
are the women to whom neoliberalism has closed off certain avenues of family
creation, yet it is difficult for most people to see how deeply these holdover
eugenic ideals coupled with a callous denial of resources can affect these most
personal decisions. On the other end of the socioeconomic spectrum, however,
neoliberal society and modern eugenic thought subtly pressure women with a
panoply of available technologies – ART.

monthly check.”). See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and
Damaging Consequences, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 151, 152 (2006) (arguing that “social science data overwhelmingly dispels the myth that women get pregnant in order to obtain welfare benefits”).
64. ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 58, at 41.
65. Editorial, Poverty and Norplant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underclass?, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec.
12, 1990, at A18.
66. Meredith Blake, Welfare and Coerced Contraception: Morality Implications of State Sponsored
Reproductive Control, 34 U. LOUISVILLE J. FAM. L. 311, 311–12 (1996); see also WASHINGTON, supra note 52,
at 206–12.
67. See Rebekah J. Smith, Family Caps in Welfare Reform: Their Coercive Effects and Damaging
Consequences, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 151, 151 (2006).
68. WASHINGTON, supra note 52, at 202.
69. WASHINGTON, supra note 52, at 206–12.
70. See Editorial, supra note 65, at A18.
71. WASHINGTON, supra note 52, at 210.
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3. The “Wild West” of ART
The commercial aspects of the U.S. market for assisted reproductive
technology have been basically unregulated.72 For everything from gamete
acquisition (sperm or egg “donation”), surrogacy, and in vitro fertilization (IVF),
the legal system regulates on scientific and health-based concerns, but allows a
market-based approach to control commercialization of assisted reproduction.73
This is problematic, as the lack of any regulatory regime does not adequately
recognize the risk of coercion, exploitation, and commodification that are
concomitant with the commercialization of reproduction.74 The dominant
neoliberal view in the United States valorizes ART as the confluence of high-tech
medicine and greater reproductive choice, and “highlights the importance and
strength of individual agency as a bulwark against commercialization’s potential
harms.”75 The two factors reinforce each other – “[t]he claim to technocultural
superiority over competitors allows the United States to assert that Western
agency shields us all from coercion, exploitation, and commodification.”76
However, those lofty ideals often do not translate well de facto to the commercial
context.
Sperm and egg “donation” in the commercial context, while framed as an
altruistic endeavor, is fundamentally a commercial transaction that displays some
of the most prevalent eugenic rhetoric in modern parlance. Sperm banks and egg
banks advertise the genetic pedigrees of their “product,” with specialized
“superdonor” databases filled with high college achievement test scores, celebrity
lookalikes, and specifications for race, ethnicity, and certain abilities.77 Commercial
surrogacy is overwhelmingly chosen by white, wealthy families who can maintain
their race and class privilege through surrogacy, while those who face race and
class disadvantages are economically pressured to submit to commercial
surveillance in surrogacy arrangements, reifying this social hierarchy.78 Preimplantation embryo selection technology (ESTs) – where parents can choose from
several embryos prepared in vitro – is also available for any number of factors,
including social sex, physical characteristics, and genetic predispositions.79

72. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, Assisted Reproductive Technology Use among Neighbours: Commercialization
Concerns in Canada and the United States, in the Global Context, in REGULATING CREATION: THE LAW,
ETHICS AND POLICY OF ASSISTED HUMAN REPRODUCTION 253, 253 (Trudo Lemmens et al., eds., 2017)
(hereinafter Ikemoto, Commercialization Concerns) (noting that “the U.S. government and the states have
enacted very few laws that specifically regulate the commercial aspects of ART”).
73. See id. (noting that a market-based approach to ART “flourishes” in the United States.).
74. See id. at 255.
75. Id. at 257.
76. Id. at 265.
77. Id. at 262; see Trudo Lemmens, The Commodification of Gametes: Why Preventing Untrammelled
Commercialization Matters, in REGULATING CREATION: THE LAW, ETHICS AND POLICY OF ASSISTED HUMAN
REPRODUCTION 415, 431–32 (Trudo Lemmens et al., eds., 2017) (discussing how the commercialization
of gametes has led to the advertisement and auctioning of “high-quality” eggs and sperm).
78. Heather E. Dillaway, Mothers for Others: A Race, Class, and Gender Analysis of Surrogacy, 34 INT’L
J. SOC. FAM. 301, 304, 318–19 (2008) (noting in particular the racial dimensions of the Anna Johnson
case).
79. Ikemoto, Commercialization Concerns, supra note 72, at 262.
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“One of the least controversial applications of ESTs is their use in selecting
against embryos that are predisposed to develop a disease or disability, a practice
sometimes known as disability screening.”80 In several countries offering this
technology, “parents are permitted to use [EST] to select against disabilities and
diseases such as Down syndrome and cystic fibrosis, but not to select against nondisease traits like normal short stature.”81 Any restrictions on the use of EST would
necessarily constitute interference with voluntary transactions between
autonomous, consenting adults – as long as there are at least some private
companies willing to provide access to ESTs, and some individuals who desire
such access, our current political moment says that the forces of supply and
demand will adequately regulate the field.
However, some argue that that particular neoliberal view of freedom is
marked by “absolute separation” from other people, objects, and contexts around
us and elevates choice as the “key moral value.”82 In this model, “[a]ll choices
made by this atomic individual, all relations, all personal attributes . . . [are]
commensurable and fungible.”83 However, such nominal freedom is hollow if it
promises choice but ignores the context and structures that limit that choice such
as access to information or resources, legal status, or even geographic location.
A more justice-focused conception of “freedom” focuses on the value of
relating to others to promote self-development while respecting personhood as
fundamentally connected to other persons, objects, and contexts that have
particularized, personal value not able to be captured in monetary terms.84
Proponents of America’s current “Wild West” of ARTs argue that, out of respect
for reproductive freedom, prospective parents should be granted a “wide sphere
of free choice regarding” EST use.85 However, when viewing that choice in context,
it is easy to see that “[w]omen are increasingly pressured to use prenatal testing
under a cultural imperative claiming that this is the ‘responsible thing to do’ . . .
the underlying communication is clear: screening out disabled fetuses is the right
thing, ‘the healthy thing,’ to do.”86 This phenomenon at large is known as
“stratified reproduction” – a conceptualization of the power relationships
reformed and reified through ART use.87 Arrangements between providers of
genetic material and surrogacy services, and the persons paying for those services,
“tap into existing social hierarchies” about race, income, and ability. Available EST
choices reflect existing social value judgments and biases.88
In the modern neoliberal context, “burden and choice are two sides of the
same coin as both impose reproductive duties on women” under the auspices of

80. Christopher Gyngell & Thomas Douglas, Selecting Against Disability: The Liberal Eugenic
Challenge and the Argument from Cognitive Diversity, 1 J. APP. PHIL. 1, 1 (2016).
81. Id. at 2.
82. Lemmens, supra note 77, at 421.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Gyngell & Douglas, supra note 80, at 2.
86. Saxton, supra note 46, at 78.
87. Lisa C. Ikemoto, Egg Freezing, Stratified Reproduction and the Logic of Not, 2 J. L. & BIOSCIENCES
112, 114 (2015).
88. See id. at 116 (arguing that ART arrangements between parties create social narratives).
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market freedom and technological superiority.89 ‘‘Women are expected to
implement the society’s eugenic prejudices by ‘choosing’ to have the appropriate
tests and ‘electing’ not to initiate or to terminate pregnancies if it looks as though
the outcome will offend.’’90 It is important here to note that the disability
community makes a clear distinction between their views on ESTs and those of
anti-abortion groups. While pro-life groups may use disabled infants on their
posters and pay lip service to the “rights” of disabled fetuses, disability advocates
make clear that “anti-abortion groups have never taken up the issues of expanding
resources for disabled people or parents of disabled children, never lobbied for
disability legislation. They have shown no interest in disabled people after they
are born.”91 Disabled people in this debate are pawns – to fully realize disabled
humanity in a landscape of ART, a more nuanced approach to disability in the
neoliberal context is necessary.
IV. WAYS FORWARD
A.

Disability as Diversity

The libertarian position on ART and ESTs in particular relies on “beliefs about
eugenics that are not merely untroubled by history but also hostile to disability.”92
That is, “everyone who is allowed to design a child will share a moral consensus
that disability is to be avoided or eliminated.”93 The neoliberal conception of
disabled people as devalued, or even valueless, is central to the legal system’s
reluctance to recognize a specific value in disabled humanity and the medical
system’s preoccupation with preventing, avoiding, and erasing disability through
even high-cost solutions. There is no sufficiently compelling direct cost-benefit
analysis to combat the neoliberal argument that parents should have maximum
control over the health of their future children, and almost everyone assumes that
such control will ultimately benefit not only the child, but society as a whole.
Some, however, claim that disability, recast as “diversity,” provides the
necessary counterbalance in the utilitarian calculus – both the repositories of
genetic diversity inhering in disabilities, and the benefits of certain kinds of
cognitive diversity in members of society.94 Some of these theorists see diversity
as an intrinsic good for society, whereas others take a more problematic
instrumental view, celebrating the “lessons” that disabled people can teach “the

89. Betsy Hartmann, Old Roots, New Shoots: Eugenics of the Everyday, 47 DIFFERENTAKES 1, 3 (2007).
90. RUTH HUBBARD, THE POLITICS OF WOMEN’S BIOLOGY 197 (1990).
91. Saxton, supra note 46, at 80–81. While many religious groups with anti-abortion platforms
have a stated commitment to charity, the gap between providing charity care for disabled persons and
lobbying for the expansion of their legal rights and recognition of their personhood is a yawning chasm
that many religious anti-abortion groups intentionally elide.
92. Michael Bérubé, Disability, Democracy, and the New Genetics, in DISABILITY STUD. READER 87,
111 (Lennard J. Davis ed., 2017).
93. Id. at 98.
94. See generally Gyngell & Douglas, supra note 80, at 8 (exploring several cost-benefit arguments
and concluding that “the presence of individuals with disability contributes to a property of the
population – diversity – which is valuable either impersonally or for some or all of the members of the
population”).
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rest of us” about “the value of life and what makes a life worth living.”95 This
clearly speaks to a nondisabled audience who lives in a customary constant state
of bodily anxiety, as presupposed and enabled by neoliberal society. Disability
studies scholars are largely critical of this view, since it co-opts individual
difference and reproduces it as monolithic “diversity,” wherein “individuals are
paradoxically expected to contribute to such diversity by channeling any marker
that signifies them as different towards the production of diversity.”96 This
smoothing over and eliding of difference “occurs through a process of
normalization, where normalization entails not removing difference but
resignifying and representing it as diversity. As such, disability as diversity figures
as the route to acceptance and harmony.”97
This simply resurrects the biopolitics of the eugenicists and repackages it as
a different kind of control – any difference which is useful is subsumed. The
diversity argument does not have to reach all difference, merely that which is
acceptable and in some way useful. If biopolitics is a categorization at its core and
the naming of the human biological experience affects stratification and control,
then the creation of “diversity” as a positive category and the sorting of disabilities
into and out of that category clearly fits the standard biopolitical mold. Advocates
can jump through hoops explicating the benefits of neurodiversity in group
problem solving or the importance of genetic diversity in animal populations and
disease resistance,98 but these arguments do not meaningfully challenge
biopolitics. Rather, they only feed into it.
B.

Reproductive Justice

Reproductive justice, a hybrid and synergistic fusion of social justice and
reproductive rights, goes beyond the binary debate between pro-choice and prolife and recognizes that the reproductive autonomy of people who can bear
children is affected by myriad social and environmental factors.99 Reproductive
justice demands a holistic system that supports reproductive choices, including
“(1) the right not to have a child, (2) the right to have a child; and (3) the right to
parent children in safe and healthy environments. In addition, reproductive justice
demands sexual autonomy and gender freedom for every human being.”100
Reproductive justice grew from Black womanism and intersectional
feminism, and thus is thoughtful and intentional about the long history of
institutionalized control over Black women’s reproduction and administrative
violence towards women overall.101 Reproductive justice advocates interrogate not
95. Gyngell & Douglas, supra note 80, at 8–9 (quoting J. McMahan, The Morality of Screening for
Disability, 10 REPROD. BIOMEDICINE ONLINE 129, 129–32 (2005)).
96. Michele Friedner & Karen Weingarten, Disability as Diversity: A New Biopolitics,
SOMATOSPHERE: INHABITABLE WORLDS (May 23, 2016), http://somatosphere.net/2016/disability-asdiversity-a-new-biopolitics.html/.
97. Id.
98. See Gyngell & Douglas, supra note 80, at 9–10 (arguing that disability screening will remove
differences that contribute to valuable human diversity).
99. ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 58, at 9.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 18–29, 70–71 (“Women of color pushed back, pointing out that both historically and in
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only the binary abortion debate, but also the blithe trust in the market for ART.
For example, regarding surrogacy, one of the founders of the movement asks,
“[S]ince surrogacy is an expensive undertaking pursued mostly by white people,
does this practice embed ideas about preserving the ‘white race’ as well as ideas
about perpetuating biological, patriarchal lineage?”102 Feminist theory and lived
experience acknowledge that parenting is important regardless of DNA, through
any combination of nuclear or non-nuclear family arrangements including
adoption, fostering, and collective parenting.103
In contrast to the singular focus on abortion by the pro-choice movement,
justice-focused work resists binaries, and finds commonalities with other social
justice movements. Justice-focused work also explicitly considers social realities
that may impact true access and choice, complicating the narrative of nominal
“universal access” to healthcare as a panacea. The ability of any person to control
their health is linked directly to the conditions in their community, which are not
a matter of individual choice and access.104 Our approach must address the social
reality of inequality and move beyond a demand for privacy and respect for
individualized decision making to include the social supports necessary for such
decisions to be optimally realized. Under this framework, autonomy “unfolds
itself and finds its shape in the context of supportive social structure.”105 An
overemphasis on nominally free decision-making actively harms women by
denying their need for resources to support each choice they may make.
Recognizing that “[r]eproductive freedom is a matter of social justice, not
individual choice” is essential to a compassionate system of regulating both
traditional contraception, abortion, and ART.106 Disability scholar (and disabled
woman) Marsha Saxton distills this idea beautifully:
I believe that at this point in history the decision to abort a fetus with a disability
even because it ‘just seems too difficult’ must be respected. A woman who makes
this decision is best suited to assess her own resources. But it is important for her
to realize this ‘choice’ is actually made under duress. Our society profoundly limits
the ‘choice’ to love and care for a baby with a disability. This failure of society
should not be projected onto the disabled fetus or child. No child is ‘defective.’ A
child’s disability doesn’t ruin a woman’s dream of motherhood. Our society’s
inability to appreciate and support people is what threatens our dreams.107

Reproductive justice considers the entire sphere of a woman’s life course and
experience that could be affecting her decisions about reproduction.108

contemporary America, ubiquitous and persistent white supremacy and population control efforts
have clarified that motherhood rights of all women are not equally valued and neither are all
children.”).
102. Id. at 208.
103. See id. (noting that “quality parenting can occur no matter whose DNA is in the child . . . ”).
104. This approach rests on the acknowledgement that the “Vote with your feet/People can just
move” argument is not a realistic policy solution for under-resourced communities.
105. Lemmens, supra note 77, at 421.
106. ROBERTS, supra note 4, at 6 (emphasis omitted).
107. Saxton, supra note 46, at 82.
108. See ROSS & SOLINGER, supra note 58, at 10–11 (arguing that an understanding of reproductive
justice must capture “historical, legal, and technological contexts in which women have lived their
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Reproductive justice concerns include environmental health, domestic violence,
food security, and the carceral system.109 Reproductive justice advocates realize
that isolation (of people, or of issues) is an artificial state that does not accurately
reflect real-world decision-making. This emphasis on the intersectionality of
identity and overlapping concerns constraining decision-making speaks to why
privacy-focused jurisprudence is next to useless for disabled persons; for disabled
persons, “there is no realm of the private. Disability is always and everywhere a
public issue, a matter for public policy . . . .”110
C.

Interest Convergence in Regulatory Solutions

Obviously, reproductive rights in the twenty-first century are badly served
by the binary debate on abortion and the reliance on free-market principles for
ART regulation. Current jurisprudence that visualizes woman-as-isolatedindividual and locates the right to control over the body within the right to privacy
and singularity does not adequately reflect the complex webs of social relations
and pressures within which decisions about reproduction are made. Litigation and
case law, with its reliance on precedent, narrow construction of rights, and
tendency to hew to the most elegant explanation possible, cannot and will not
provide a satisfactory framework for true reproductive justice moving forward.
However, the adage that one cannot legislate social change holds true for litigation
as well – “it takes a mobilized social movement to change values, images, and
power relations.”111
Most importantly, the law must recognize that the crushing lack of resources
available for disabled people to live full and happy lives is unquestionably part of
the decision-making process for a woman carrying a fetus that she knows will be
disabled. Programs which fully support the disabled persons right to be and to
thrive will lead to an increased acceptance that a disabled child does not have to
entail an extreme financial burden or acceptance of social stigma. The prevalence
of disability in our society provides ample room for interest convergence
arguments at the policymaking level – “[d]isability is an ambiguous demographic,
but one that is unambiguously increasing.”112 Further, making more resources
available for disabled people dovetails well with current arguments surrounding
health justice and broader economic equality.113 Some disability scholars argue

reproductive lives . . . ”).
109. See id. at 9–11 (noting that reproductive choices depend on access to fundamental community
resources).
110. Bérubé, supra note 92, at 99.
111. Petchesky, supra note 41, at 107.
112. G.T. Fujiura, Emerging Trends in Disability, POPULATION REFERENCE BUREAU (Sept. 1,
2001), https://www.prb.org/emergingtrendsindisability/; see also Kate Wilson, What Does Disability Have
to do with Universal Health Coverage?, GLOBAL HEALTH IMPACT BLOG (Aug. 8, 2017), http://www.msh
.org/blog/2017/08/08/what-does-disability-inclusion-have-to-do-with-universal-health-coverage.
113. See Tim Faust, The Case for Single-Payer, JACOBIN (Oct. 03, 2017), https://www.jacobinmag
.com/2017/10/single-payer-medicare-for-all-bernie-sanders; Susan Sherry & Michael Miller, Advancing
Health Justice: Building a Health System that Works for Everyone, COMMUNITY CATALYST (Mar. 6, 2019),
https://www.communitycatalyst.org/resources/publications/document/2019/CC_HealthJusticePaper_
Final.pdf.
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that longer lifespans, environmental health hazards, and near-constant military
conflicts are transforming disability into a “new normal” that affects larger and
larger swaths of the population.114 If activists could consistently highlight the
probability of currently able-bodied policymakers and the people they care about
“crossing over” into a disability status, they could leverage the concept of “interest
convergence” to push thorough policies that benefit historically subordinated and
marginalized populations.
Interest convergence, as distilled by the late Derrick Bell, is a major tenet of
critical race theory. It holds that the “interests of a subordinated minority will be
accommodated only when they converge with the interests of the dominant
majority . . . .”115 As such, legal remedies and policies benefitting the subordinated
group rely on policymakers “concluding that such remedies ‘will secure, advance,
or at least not harm’ majority group interests.”116 Generally, in the disability
politics sphere, interest convergence arguments concede that rhetoric around
individual self-sufficiency, equality, and human dignity are inadequate to attain
or maintain support for law benefitting disabled persons, and that “practical
politics may require identifying and highlighting benefits to nondisabled
[persons] . . . .”117 However, interest convergence has special relevance for policies
surrounding resources for disabled persons, as it is one of the few subordinated
categories into which a member of the majority can cross at any time, even
involuntarily.118
It may seem perverse to utilize the bodily anxiety essential to neoliberal
society’s rejection of the disabled as an incentive to provide resources for those
populations, but it is more palatable than trying to fit disabled personhood into a
neoliberal value calculation. And without policies providing adequate resources
for disabled persons, we cannot hope to change the narrative of suffering around
bearing and raising a disabled child. A myopic focus on “choice” without attention
to the availability of resources and the presence of coercive or controlling policies
allows the law to react to a woman’s “poor choice-making” with penalties and
stigma. Increased resources will lead to more disabled people living full lives,
participating in greater society, and bringing attention to the fact that disabled life
is not inherently worse or less valuable or overwhelmed with suffering. More ablebodied people recognizing disabled humanity and realizing that it is possible to
love life in a disabled body will spark a positive feedback loop of even more
resource provision.

114. Friedner & Weingarten, supra note 96.
115. Michelle A. Travis, Lashing Back at ADA Backlash: How the Americans with Disabilities Act Benefits
Americans Without Disabilities, 76 TENN. L. REV. 311, 312 (2009).
116. Id. at 312 (quoting Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the InterestConvergence Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523–25 (1980)).
117. Travis, supra note 115, at 312.
118. The author notes that the specific categories of disability to which EST is applicable –
congenital birth defects – are those that it is impossible for abled persons to “cross” into. However, the
presence of congenitally disabled people provokes that intrinsic neoliberal bodily anxiety (the fear of
crossing over into the “valueless” subgroup), and that anxiety can fuel either efforts to stamp out the
category entirely, or a movement to use interest convergence to advocate for better conditions for the
disabled people in society.
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If the regulatory environment supports people with disabilities, it would
communicate to women that giving birth to a child with a disability will not
subject that child (and their family unit) to unadulterated suffering and stigma.
This new environment would therefore afford women, especially poor women,
much greater reproductive autonomy. Reproductive rights work must widen its
perspective past only protecting a woman’s right to not have a child. It must
demand our government to protect a woman’s right to have a child and to raise
that child in a healthy and safe environment, regardless of what congenital
conditions the baby may have.
V. CONCLUSION
The rights of disabled people will not be adequately protected in either a
libertarian free-market system or by forming coalitions with the “pro-life”
advocates. One positions disability as an insurmountable obstacle to a happy life.
The other uses disabled fetuses as a prop and devotes no attention to the actual
resources necessary for disabled people to thrive. We cannot allow free-market
neoliberalism or ideological partisan politics to control the opportunities available
through ARTs. A justice-focused regulatory system that recognizes the dangers of
stratified reproduction and disability discrimination is the best hope to allow
individuals to navigate the industry and safeguard their reproductive autonomy
while secure in the knowledge that there will be resources available to support
whichever choice they make. By supporting women in bearing and raising
children with disabilities, we recognize the humanity of disabled persons as
separate and distinct from the net economic value they add to society. In a
neoliberal framework, this is a scary concept. This framework is so endemic and
ingrained that most people do not even recognize that it is influencing their
choices.
Suggesting that we reject biopolitical categorization of human life by ability
and “value” may seem like suggesting that we breathe water instead of air, or that
gravity is not the best idea. However, unless we are to blithely repeat the eugenic
mistakes and institutionalize the dehumanizing practices of our forebears, we
must carefully interrogate what we now accept: the diverse choices being offered
by ARTs, how society decides which women have access to technologies and
which women are barely afforded the right to reproduce at all. Most crucially, we
must examine how societal factors and resource deficits direct the reproductive
choices of individual women and question whether those choices are freely made,
after all. We cannot continue to leave ART to regulation purely by market forces
and abdicate our responsibility in this arena. Whatever regulatory framework is
added must be a comprehensive effort to assure maximum reproductive
autonomy to all women by assuring maximum support for the autonomy and life
chances of the children they may bear, whatever genes they carry with them.

